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The break-up of Yugoslavia and gaining of independence in 1991 are in 
Slovenia largely considered to be the most important milestones in Slovene 
history.1 Slovene has actually been an official language in the Slovene part 
of Yugoslavia since 1918, and Slovenia—as one of the six Yugoslav 
republics of the communist federation—enjoyed cultural and, in some 
periods, even relatively great economic and political autonomy. However, 
Slovenes never had an independent state before 1991,2 and their political 
leaders never considered Slovenia’s independence, nor did they try to 
mobilize the population with any plans for independent statehood in the 
nineteenth and (for most of the) twentieth centuries. For almost 140 years—
from the first Slovene national-political program in 1848 under the 
Habsburg monarchy, to the culmination of the political and economic crisis 
in communist Yugoslavia in the second half of the 1980s—unification of 
the territory populated by a Slovene-speaking population in an autonomous 
unit within a wider federal, multi-national state community (Habsburg 
monarchy up to 1918, and Yugoslavia after 1918) was the national-political 
goal of Slovene politics.  
It is therefore not surprising that at the beginning of the second half 
of the 1980s, when Yugoslavia was already breaking up, public opinion in 
Slovenia was still largely supportive of finding a solution to the political 
and economic crisis within the framework of the Yugoslav state and its 
existing political system. In 1986, according to public opinion polls, 34% of 
the respondents still believed that relations among the nations in Yugoslavia 
were good, and a little more than 42% of them believed that they were 
neither good nor bad; the demands for Slovenia to leave Yugoslavia and 
become independent, which were expressed in 1987 and 1988 by a small 
group of intellectuals, did not enjoy any wider support of the population 
even in the spring of 1990 (Toš 1997: 509–26, 619–32). But, under the 
influence of aggressive Serbian nationalism, an economic and financial 
crisis, as well as increasingly evident differences in the dynamics of 
democratization processes in the various parts of Yugoslavia, the public 
                                                
1  The first part of this article was already published under the title “On Slovene 
Troubles with the Recent Past and Historical Memory” (Vodopivec 2010). 
2  The historical myth of the early Medieval “Slovene state”—the principality of 
Karantanija, located on the territory of today’s Austrian Carinthia—which 
emerged in the nineteenth century and is still popular in Slovenia, did not 
visibly affect Slovene national and political programs and decisions in the 




attitude rapidly changed. In the spring of 1990, when the first multi-party 
Slovene parliament was elected in the first truly democratic elections after 
WW II, Slovenia abandoned the one-party system. At the end of December 
of that year, a plebiscite was held in which as many as 88% of voters voted 
in favor of Slovenia’s independence, with a turnout of more than 93%. 
Thus, the history of Slovenia’s move towards independence was rather short 
and a decisive turn-around in public opinion in favor of leaving Yugoslavia 
only happened in the last year before the proclamation of Slovenia’s 
independence.  
However, since the early 1990s, in an atmosphere of rising internal 
and foreign political insecurity and growing conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, the opinion prevailed in Slovene politics and the public 
that a break-up was unavoidable and that Slovenia had to make a decisive 
cut with everything that could potentially link it to the rest of Yugoslavia. 
Some of the new political leaders and politically engaged intellectuals 
observed that for Slovenia an “exit” from Yugoslavia meant an irreversible 
“move from the Balkans to Central Europe, from the periphery to the 
center.” Moreover, even for the Slovene government, there was no dilemma 
between “Europe and the Balkans,” since Slovenia’s goal could only be 
Europe.4 The earliest possible accession of the new Slovene state to the 
European Union, NATO, and other international political, financial, and 
economic organizations became the priority of Slovene policy. After the 
break-up of Yugoslavia, Slovenia only preserved closer links with Croatia; 
however, in the first half of the 1990s, Slovene-Croatian relations also 
started to be strained as Ljubljana and Zagreb failed to agree on their shared 
land and sea borders, as well as on some other unsolved succession-related 
issues. Ljubljana showed some interest in cooperation with Bosnia and 
Herzegovina too, because during the war there were more than 50,000 
Bosnian refugees in Slovenia and, after the war, Bosnia became a market 
for the Slovene economy.  
 
I 
The Slovene leadership paid no significant attention to re-establishing 
relations with the Serbian and Montenegrin part of the former Yugoslavia 
before the late 1990s. In the first half of the 1990s, it seemed for a brief 
period that Ljubljana and Belgrade would establish diplomatic relations; 
however, since in the opinion of the Slovene authorities Serbian politics 
was the main reason for the war in Bosnia and the failure of negotiations on 
the succession of Yugoslavia’s property, relations between Slovenia and the 
“internationally unrecognized” Federal Republic of Yugoslavia could not 
                                                
4  Statement by the President of the Republic of Slovenia, Janez Drnovšek, in 
June 1995. (Dnevnik [Ljubljana], 3 June 1995). 
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yet normalize. Although Slovenia recognized the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia after the Dayton Accords in 1995, relations between the 
countries did not change even in the second half of the 1990s. For Slovenia, 
the main barriers to improving relations were Milošević clinging to power, 
international sanctions against the Serbian-Montenegrin state, and its non-
cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague (Bukowski 2006). Ljubljana only decided 
to become more actively engaged on the territory of the dissolved Yugoslav 
federation in the late 1990s, when it became obvious that there were no 
serious barriers to Slovenia’s membership of the European Union and 
NATO, and when America’s bombing of Serbia had weakened the 
Milošević regime. In 1999, Slovenia acceded to the Stability Pact for 
Southeast Europe and, a year later (two months after Milošević’s defeat in 
elections and seven months before he was handed over to the ICTY) it 
established diplomatic relations with the Serbian and Montenegrin Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia. 
 After relations with Belgrade had normalized and, in particular, 
after Slovenia had joined the European Union in 2004, Slovene politicians 
and diplomats tried to gain an international reputation in Europe and the 
U.S. as experts on the successor countries of the former Yugoslavia and on 
”the Balkans.” However, the views that political leaders, the media, and 
also a considerable number of other authors spread at home concerning the 
dissolved Yugoslavia and Slovenia’s position within the federation, were 
fragmentary and one-sided. They were formed under the strong influence of 
the crisis in the 1980s, the violent military intervention in Slovenia in 1991 
and bloody conflicts in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo since 
the early 1990s. Although the opinions expressed in public discussions and 
media commentaries on Yugoslavia, and Slovenia’s position in it, varied, 
the prevailing public and political discourse mostly emphasised the constant 
tensions among the former Yugoslav nations and political elites, and the 
allegedly insurmountable differences between the “north” and the “south” 
(or rather, the east and the west).6 They also highlighted disagreements 
between “centralist” or “federalist” views on governing the common state 
that had never been overcome and which prevented, according to these 
                                                
6  An article “The Creation of the Republic of Slovenia and its development” 
published in 2006 on the web page of the Government Communication Office 
on the occasion of the fifteenth anniversary of Slovenia's independence even 
said that in “the acute crisis facing the Yugoslav communist system” in the 
1980s it became clear that “the social, economic, cultural and political structure 
of the Slovenian nation was not compatible with the structures of the other 
Yugoslav nations.” Although the author of the article is a university professor 
and historian, such positions were rather exceptional even for the right-wing 





views, true national equality and hindered Slovenia’s economic, social and 
cultural development. In such conditions, the break-up of Yugoslavia was 
presented as more or less unavoidable and as a consequence of unsolved 
(and obviously also unsolvable) national issues. Serbian nationalism was 
(and is) believed to be the main reason behind the violent disintegration of 
the Yugoslav state, which, together with the leaders of the Yugoslav army, 
caused the war on its territory. Particularly critical positions on the 
disintegrated Yugoslavia were advocated by the Slovene political right and 
by some parties that had emerged during the process of Slovenia’s 
independence. On the other hand, the leaders and followers of the parties 
that had emerged from communist era political organizations were more 
reserved in their judgments. Nevertheless, they also claimed that the 
Slovenes did not in fact fit in the Yugoslav “Balkan inn” and that their 
integration into Yugoslavia back in 1918 was a “mistake,” an opinion that 
was even mentioned in the statement of the foreign ministry of the 
governing coalition led by the liberal democratic party (a successor of the 
former communist youth organization) in 2000.7  
 However, Slovene public opinion and political parties were not so 
much concerned about the issues of a disintegrated Yugoslavia and 
Slovenia’s position in it, as they were divided upon the issues of Yugoslav 
communism and the events in Slovenia during WW II and immediately 
after the communists had victoriously risen to power in 1945. After the 
multi-party system had been reinstated in Slovenia, a reconciliation 
ceremony took place in the summer of 1990 at one of the largest post-WW 
II massacre sites of the adversaries of the Partisan resistance movement. 
While the President of the still Yugoslav Republic of Slovenia, Milan 
Kučan, and the Slovene Metropolitan, Alojzij Šuštar, solemnly shook hands 
as a sign of historical reconciliation, a true and open debate on recent 
history only began after political democratization and the proclamation of 
Slovenia’s independence in 1991. There were many critics of the Yugoslav 
and Slovene communist regime who then for the first time openly expressed 
their political views and disclosed their traumatic experiences with the 
communist authorities. There were also those who fiercely opposed 
communism, described it as a criminal system, and called on the new 
Slovene authorities to deal resolutely with the communist past, including 
the events of WW II, partisan resistance, and collaboration. The most 
fervent advocates of the revision of the “communist past” even denied the 
importance of the Slovene resistance movement in the period 1941–45 and 
equated it with the communist movement. They claimed that the members 
                                                
7  “Deset let samostojne slovenske zunanje politike, maj 1990-maj 2000” (Ten 
years of independent Slovene foreign policy, May 1990–May 2000), Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia. See: www.mzz.gov.si/si/ 
zakonodaja_in_dokumenti/dokumenti/deset_let_samostojne_slovenske_zunanj
e_politike/ 
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of the Slovene anti-partisan units and their leaders were not collaborators of 
the occupying forces but anti-communist fighters, which triggered a fierce 
public and polemical debate. The controversy was further deepened by the 
discoveries of mass graves of Slovene, Croat, Serb, and Montenegrin 
members of collaborationist units, adversaries of the partisan movement, 
anti-communists, and other political fugitives, together with an unidentified 
number of members of the German minority in Slovenia and the Vojvodina 
region who had been fleeing to the West and whom the Yugoslav Army in 
1945 summarily executed and secretly buried on Slovene territory on the 
orders of the communist leadership.8 
However, in the 1990s, the Slovene government and political 
parties still underestimated the political dimensions of the post-war killings 
that had been kept secret for years. They did practically nothing to 
investigate them, nor did they accelerate the process of grave marking, the 
identification of victims and enabling them a decent funeral. The liberal-
democratic party, the United List of Social Democrats (former communists) 
and some smaller parties mostly rejected the criticism of Yugoslav 
communism and the partisan movement during WW II. They claimed that 
the Slovene anti-fascist struggle and the striving of Slovene communists for 
a federal organization of Yugoslavia in fact contributed to the formation of 
an independent Slovene state. In addition, even public opinion was not in 
favor of a more radical “settling of accounts” with the recent past and even 
some historians still rejected the tendencies to reinterpret the history of WW 
II and the communist era. Indicative of this was the 1996 exhibition at the 
National Museum of Contemporary History entitled “Slovenes in the 
Twentieth Century.” Although based on concrete research, there was not a 
single word about post-war communist violence. This provoked the writer 
Drago Jančar to protest publicly and, together with a group of historians, he 
prepared an alternative exhibition about the dark side of recent Slovene 




After attaining independence in 1991, Slovenia, not surprisingly, 
witnessed no mass renaming of streets and squares, or removal of 
                                                
8  According to the estimates of a government commission for solving the issues 
of the communist period secret grave sites, established in 2005, there were 
several tens of thousands of executions of people without any trial on the 
territory of today’s Slovenia after WW II  (in 1945 and 1946); 14,000–15,000 
had lived before the war on today’s Slovene territory, and the rest were Croats, 
Serbs, Montenegrins, and Germans from Vojvodina. So far, the commission 
has recorded more than 600 locations of the so-called hidden (or until the end 




monuments. Around forty streets and public areas were renamed in 
Ljubljana in the 1990s. Among the first was the central street—Titova cesta 
(Tito Street), which became Slovenska cesta (Slovene Street). In some other 
towns, though, even streets and squares named after Tito were preserved; 
for instance, in the post-war industrial town of Velenje (for some time 
called Titovo Velenje), where a several-meter high statue of Tito still stands 
today, with no major controversy. Some streets and public areas named 
after Slovene communist politicians and personalities and after some 
important events of the resistance movement during WW II have been also 
preserved, while the names of streets and parks named after important 
personalities of the international and Yugoslav communist movement have 
been replaced by earlier city names, traditional names, or names bearing a 
Slovene national connotation. The case with monuments was similar. Some 
monuments honoring the leaders of the communist regime, its 
achievements, and milestones were removed without any controversy, 
though quite a few of them were preserved, which in some places triggered 
public protests. There was, however, less controversy in the case of 
monuments honoring the partisan resistance and victims of fascism in the 
period 1941–45, since the majority of the population supported their 
preservation. Again, reactions (in particular of the political left and ex-
partisans) to the new monuments honoring the memory of collaborators, 
adversaries of the partisan movement, and victims of communism during 
and after the war were more adverse. These monuments were erected by 
their former fellow fighters and supporters, relatives, local priests and other 
people who had been persecuted under the communist regime. The 
memorial services that took place at the unveiling of these monuments and 
at the graves of post-war victims of communism turned into open battles for 
the “true history” and for historical memory; statements blaming only the 
communists for the Slovene “civil war” during WW II and the mass 
violence that followed it, irreconcilably divided (and still divide) political 
parties and public opinion.9   
  The political parties established in 1990–91 and after Slovenia’s 
independence mostly did not look back into history when choosing their 
                                                
9  According to a survey conducted on the outskirts of Ljubljana in 2002, erecting 
monuments to victims on the anti-partisan side and for executed en masse after 
the war was received with less resistance and more understanding at the local 
level—i.e., in the towns and villages from which these victims had come—than 
at the state level. In these towns and villages, the prevailing opinion was that all 
the victims from the local community should be given a monument, or at least a 
proper grave, regardless of how and on which side they lost their lives during 
and after the war. According to the majority of respondents, it was completely 
unacceptable that for all the years after the war, some of them could not even 
have a grave and were judged not by what they did in their lives but by their 
political and ideological position (Vodopivec 2002).  
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names and role models. However, in 1992, the leaders of Kmečka zveza – 
Ljudska stranka (Farmers’ Union – People’s Party) proclaimed their party 
to be the successor to the largest Slovene political party in the period of the 
Habsburg Monarchy and of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia—the Catholic 
Slovenska ljudska stranka (Slovene People’s Party). Both the newly-
established Slovene Social Democratic Party (SDS), which was very critical 
of the communists, as well as the party comprising former communists, 
which transformed into social democrats, Združena lista socialnih 
demokratov (ZLSD, United List of Social Democrats), claimed to be 
historically related to Slovene social democracy established back in the late 
ninetheenth century. Nevertheless, the latter (ZLSD) also did not hesitate to 
mention the League of Communists as its predecessor, emphasizing in its 
program its anti-fascist character and the achievements of the social and 
economic policy of the Yugoslav and Slovene communists, the federal 
system of the Yugoslav state and “socialist self-management.” The 
communists even enjoyed the support of a substantial part of the population 
after the introduction of the multi-party system in Slovenia because of their 
resistance to Serb and Yugoslav military pressures in the last years of 
Yugoslavia and their support for democratization processes and Slovenia’s 
independence in 1990–91. At the first multi-party elections in 1990, the 
former president of the Slovene League of Communists, Milan Kučan, was 
elected president of the Republic, with a convincing majority of 58.6%, and 
the United List of Social Democrats was and remained one of the largest 
political parties.10 Before the presidential elections in 1997, the Social 
Democratic Party (SDS) and the Christian Democratic Party submitted to 
the parliament a bill on lustration and a declaration on condemnation of the 
communist regime, which, however, failed to gain sufficient support from 
the deputies. Milan Kučan was easily re-elected the President of the 
Republic (with 55.57% of the vote). Moreover, in the second half of the 
1990s, the negative image of communist Yugoslavia that had prevailed in 
the first years after independence also started to change in public opinion 
polls, with an increasing number of respondents retaining a relatively 
positive memory of it.   
 Nevertheless, heated public and political debates about more recent 
history continued, concentrating not so much on the reasons for the 
disintegration of the former Yugoslavia but more on the events during WW 
II and the communist era in Slovenia. As Slovenia’s independence became 
an increasingly distant event, only contradictory perceptions of the 
Yugoslav communist regime remained subjects of public and political 
                                                
10  At the first multi-party elections in April 1990, the ex-communists, then called 
the Party of Democratic Renovation, even won the most votes of all the parties 
(17.3%), which was—as claimed by their political adversaries—also a result of 
their many advantages inherited from the past, which the newly founded parties 




debate. In the opinion of the fiercest critics the Social Democratic Party 
(SDS)—this regime did not differ much from the communist regimes in the 
Soviet Union or Eastern European, since it was incorrigibly “totalitarian” 
throughout the four and half decades until its final breakdown in the early 
1990s. Such extreme views, however, did not enjoy wide public support. 
Public opinion was considerably more moderate in its views, claiming that 
in the evolution of communist Yugoslavia, more authoritarian periods were 
followed by less authoritarian ones and that the Yugoslav communist 
system was incomparably more open and democratic than the Soviet or 
Eastern European one. The claims about the unacceptable “totalitarian” 
nature of Yugoslav communism were most fervently rejected by the ZLSD. 
Members of this party also strongly objected to accusations that it was 
exclusively communist leaders and the revolution that were guilty of the 
post-war killings of real and alleged opponents of the partisan movement 
and communism. Although they condemned the atrocious executions of 
collaborators and other refugees who fled westwards across the territory of 
Slovenia at the end of war, they claimed that it was a consequence of the 
divisions that had arisen during the war and civil war—a conflict that had in 
fact been triggered by the support that leaders of middle-class parties and 
the Catholic church had given to collaboration and the anti-partisan 
resistance.  
 Any expectations that the political battle for historical memory and 
interpretation would ease after Slovenia’s accession to the European Union 
in 2004 soon proved to be unfounded. In the parliamentary elections in 
October 2004, the Slovene Democratic Party (SDS) (until 2003, Social 
Democratic Party) won by a large majority. On the initiative of the new 
government coalition headed by SDS, a new sector was founded within the 
Ministry of Justice in 2005, responsible for the Rectification of Injustices 
and Reconciliation (it was transformed in 2008 into the independent Study 
Center for National Reconciliation). One of its tasks was to investigate the 
crimes committed against the Slovene population by “all three totalitarian 
regimes” (fascist, Nazi, and communist). At first, it indeed carried out some 
well-founded research, but after some time it became hostage to the right-
wing political parties and their pragmatic demand for uncompromising 
condemnation of “communist totalitarianism.” Some prominent 
parliamentary deputies and members of SDS even claimed that the political 
system in Yugoslavia had been “Stalinist” the whole time and had acquired 
a more “human image” only a few years before the fall of the Berlin wall. 
When the Social Democrats (ex-communists) came to power in 2008, 
disputes about “recent history” became still sharper. Eventually, the 
European Parliament’s Resolution on the European Conscience and 
Totalitarianism, adopted in spring 2009 divided Slovene political parties 
and the public completely. The leading opposition Slovene Democratic 
Party (SDS) demanded that the Slovene Parliament should also adopt a 
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special declaration condemning the Yugoslav communist regime. The 
Social Democrats and other left-wing parties opposed it and the coalition 
deputies holding a majority decided that no special declaration in support of 
the European resolution would be adopted.  
 
III 
Both the recent and more distant past caused (and still cause) considerably 
less adversarial debate and conflict in Slovene historiography. Slovene 
historiography experienced an important methodological and conceptual 
modernization beginning in the middle of the 1980s. Mostly younger 
researchers, employing research models of Western European (and 
especially German and French) historians, began already in the second half 
of the 1980s to explore social and cultural historical themes, which Slovene 
historians had not to date devoted particular attention. At the same time, 
they discussed the Slovene past (from the Middle Ages to the most recent 
history) in a nationally, ideologically, and politically more relaxed way than 
their predecessors and teachers. Peter Štih, today the leading Slovene 
medievalist, has thus in the last two decades convincingly de-nationalized 
the traditional nationally mythicized image of Medieval history, since it was 
clear, as he wrote, that in studying pre-national societies it is not possible to 
“derive from contemporary national concepts and explanations, which 
create boundaries where formerly they did not exist” (2009: 7). With the 
broadening of the previously narrow national framework of history that was 
restricted to the “Slovene speaking population,” investigation of the 
German and Italian nobility and middle class in regions with a Slovene 
population gained new validity. As a corollary, researchers were 
successfully introduced to the methods of historical anthropology. At the 
same time, the one-sided dark image of the Habsburg monarchy changed in 
the writing of history. The new position maintained that the monarchy had 
gradually modernized and democratized from the eighteenth century, and 
the Slovenes, just like other non-German and non-Hungarian nations, 
quickly advanced” and developed into a “fully developed nation” in the 
nineteenth century despite unfavorable conditions and “justifiable feelings 
of being threatened by the stronger German speaking co-citizens.” In this, 
the majority of Slovenes were undoubtedly “bound to the dynasty” and to 
have felt the monarchy to be their homeland, although, at the same time, 
they supported the idea of its transformation into a federally arranged state, 
which would enable the Slavs, south-Slavs, and Slovenes national equality. 
 Slovene historians traditionally focused on the Slovene past in 
their research, and they assessed and are still assessing also the two 
Yugoslavias (the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes [SCS] and the 
post-war communist federation) from the perspective of the Slovene 




were (and remain) more or less of the opinion that the centralist state system 
and the nationalist-unitarist tendencies of the Serbian parties and the court 
were the main reasons for the political and national tensions in the first 
Yugoslavia. The Serbian parties and court strove for state and national 
unification as rapidly as possible, regardless of the major social, economic, 
and cultural disparities among the various parts of the country and its ethnic 
groups. However, there is also no doubt for the most recent Slovene 
historiography that the Slovene decision in favor of Yugoslavia in 1918 had 
been massively supported by the population and that the Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia brought Slovenes great progress in all aspects (national, 
political, economic, and cultural). The Slovene territory, which had been 
part of the poorly developed southern periphery of the Habsburg Monarchy, 
became after 1918, as pointed out by the economic historian Žarko 
Lazarević, virtually overnight a part of the developed west of the new 
Yugoslav state. In addition, the Slovenes experienced, as cultural historians 
note, a dynamic cultural atmosphere, open to Europe, which they had not 
known before, despite their dissatisfaction with the centralist and 
authoritarian political system.12 Both major Slovene parties, the Liberals 
and the Catholics, at this time actively cooperated in Yugoslav political life, 
albeit following distinct strategies. Liberals supported centralism in 
association with Serbian democrats, fearing that the transformation of the 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia into a federation would lead to the dominance of 
the much stronger Catholic party in the Slovene part of the country, while 
the autonomist-oriented Catholic party adapted to short-term political 
conditions and traded for various concessions, in part by its frequent 
alliances with Serbian radicals (Perovšek 1996). 
Critical historical research of the period of socialist Yugoslavia 
could only start in Slovenia, as in other successor states of Yugoslavia, after 
the fall of the communist regime. While the consensus view for the last two 
to three decades has maintained that the regime in Yugoslavia was 
considerably different from that in other communist countries and the 
Soviet Union following the dispute of Yugoslav communists with 
Moscow—that is, from the early 1950s onwards—there was and still is 
disagreement in assessments of the degree of authoritarianism and 
repression in Yugoslavia, everyday political practices, the functioning of the 
federation, the role of Slovene politicians within it, and their reform 
initiatives and goals. In more recent evaluations of the actual functioning of 
the federation, there has been an increasingly prevalent opinion that 
efficient decision-making among the nations was hindered not by the 
constant conflicts between (allegedly Serb) centralist and (Croat-Slovene) 
                                                
12  These are also the assessments of the most recent monograph reviews of 
Slovene history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. See: Fischer et al. 
(2005: 177–506); Vodopivec (2006: 162–237); Vodopivec, Simoniti, and Štih 
(2008: 311–55); and Luthar (2008: 369–418). 
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federalist tendencies but by communist policy, which remained committed 
to the principles of democratic centralism and ideological unity. In short, 
such a view recognizes that “true federalism is not compatible with 
authoritarian power.” 
In addition, some authors point out that Slovene leaders, headed by 
Edvard Kardelj, had in fact actively helped to shape the Yugoslav political 
and economic system and therefore shared responsibility for its successes 
and failures. The almost decade-long process of Yugoslav disintegration in 
the period 1980–90 was thus not just a result of economic crisis and 
obviously insurmountable national tensions, but also of a deep crisis of the 
communist system, whose “term of use” had literally “expired” two decades 
after the liberal reforms had been violently suppressed in the early 1970s. 
The tragic break-up of the Yugoslav federation was, at the same time, 
accelerated by differences in the dynamics of democratization processes in 
various parts of the country and an irreconcilable nationalism that 
permeated Serbia after Miloševič’s seizure of political power.  
In researching the most recent history of 1945–91, the position of 
Slovenia and its development within Yugoslavia, rather than Yugoslavia as 
a whole, have continued to be the center of attention of Slovene historians. 
The only original Slovene outline of the history of the two Yugoslavias was 
thus published in 1995 by Jože Pirjevec, who, as a Slovene from Trieste, 
had observed Yugoslavia more from outside than from inside. Pirjevec did 
not doubt the long term Slovene allegiance to Yugoslavia but he presented 
Yugoslavia as an explicitly controversial formation, more prone to division 
than to cohesion from the very start. His book received favorable reviews in 
Slovenia and sold well, but it did not provoke any particular professional 
discussion and even less ambition to follow it. Pirjevec’s (2003) second 
comprehensive book, The Yugoslav Wars 1991-2001, in which he analyzed 
military conflicts and wars in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and 
Hercegovina in the 1990s, shared the same fate. In contrast, Pirjevec’s third 
book, Tito and Comrades (2011), became a real literary success, although, 
again, it did not excite any more lively comment or interest among Slovene 
historians. 
The main attention of Slovene historians was and is, as has been 
said, directed at studying Slovene conditions and Slovene development in 
the forty-five year period that divides the end of the WW II and the creation 
of socialist Yugoslavia, from Slovene independence. Among the most 
important achievements in the study of history since 1945 are systematic 
analyses of the development of the Slovene economy and its inclusion in 
the Yugoslav economy, which reveal that Slovenia, despite the 
dissatisfaction of politicians and the population with federal economic and 
financial policies, only really developed into a modern industrial society 




Yugoslav cultural and educational policies, which appear increasingly lively 
and pluralistic, show cultural life open to Western Europe from the 1950s 
onwards. This development was accompanied by recurring attempts of still 
scarce groups of critical intellectuals to expand the area of freedom and 
democracy; these, however, were not widely accepted by the public. The 
communist regime in Slovenia did not have any serious opposition until the 
1980s; throughout the period, however, opposition intellectuals had been 
victims of political pressure and persecution. Researchers have also devoted 
ever greater attention to regime violence, especially in the first decades after 
WW II. In the last decade and a half, a large number of well-received works 
have thus been published which deal with the bloody post-WW II settling of 
accounts by the authorities with real and imaginary enemies, the political 
trials in Slovenia, the violent communist policy towards the Catholic 
Church and priesthood, and the functioning of the Slovene and Yugoslav 
secret police. At the same time, particular attention has been devoted to the 
repeat attempts at reforming the Yugoslav economy and political system, 
including the question of whether the reforms that the so-called communist 
liberals proposed in the second half of the 1960s would have succeeded in 
prolonging the life of communist Yugoslavia, or at least enabled its more 
peaceful dissolution. 
The greatest discord in Slovene historiography is still caused by 
differing views on conditions in Slovenia and Yugoslavia during WW II. 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, a series of studies has been published, 
which have extensively broadened the understanding of WW II on Slovene 
territory. They have mainly cleaved between a focus on resistance (relations 
among the groups participating in the Liberation Front, communist policy, 
and military-political strategy of the partisan struggle) and a focus on 
collaboration (the policy of the parties and groups opposing the Liberation 
Front, the activities of the dignitaries of the Ljubljana Diocese, etc.) I have 
discussed recent historical research dealing with these issues elsewhere 
(Vodopivec 2003; 2006a) and will instead focus on the historians’ 
prevailing opinions about the causes of the internal Slovene conflict, of 
collaboration, and of communist supremacy in the anti-occupation struggle 
in Slovenia. This can be summed up as follows: internal Slovene wartime 
conflicts had their roots in pre-war Yugoslav and Slovene social and 
political instability, political cleavage, and the lack of a longer democratic 
tradition in Slovenia. At the time of and after the occupation of 1941, the 
major political parties underestimated the readiness of the population to 
actively resist the occupiers and thus enabled a modest group of 
communists to take the initiative and to organize the resistance, which they 
gradually turned into a social and political revolution. The civil war, to 
which the communists significantly contributed by increasing violence 
against their ideological and political opponents, erupted mostly in the 
central part of Slovene territory (in the so-called Ljubljana Province). Its 
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main initiators were, on the one side, the communists, who proclaimed the 
Liberation Front to be the only representative of the “Slovene nation,” and 
threatened with liquidation anyone who tried to organize anti-occupation 
resistance units outside it; and, on the other side, the militant, particularly 
Catholic anti-communists who, instead of organizing anti-occupation 
resistance themselves, sought support for their anti-communist struggle first 
with the Italian and then with the German authorities, and thus agreed to 
collaboration. This was so much more tragic because the majority of 
Slovenes taking part in the resistance movement were Catholics, while both 
sides entangled in the uncompromising conflict—one supporting the 
Liberation Front and the other opposing it—believed in an Allied victory 
and tried to establish contacts with them. The price of the ruthless war from 
1941 to 1945 was extremely high. According to research carried out by the 
Institute of Modern History since 1996, the costs were much higher than the 
estimates published under the communist regime. The latest research shows 
that between 1941 and 1946, more than 98,000 people who lived in 1941 on 
the territory of the present state of Slovenia lost their lives as a result of the 
war, including approximately 14,600 real or alleged Slovene opponents of 
the partisan movement and the communists who were summarily executed 
by the communist victors from May 1945 until the end of that year 
(Deželak-Barič 2014: 11–46).18  
These historiographical reinterpretations of developments during 
and immediately after WW II naturally have their opponents, although—at 
least among historians—they are a minority. Some historians still continue 
to reject critical evaluation of communist policy and co-responsibility for 
the civil war; some of them are not even willing to accept the view that a 
civil war raged in Slovenia between 1941 and 1945, and reject all attempts 
at a modified, more differentiated interpretation of the wartime conflicts and 
reckonings as unacceptable “revisionism.” On the other hand, there is a 
group of historians who are unwilling to admit that the Liberation Front and 
movement had fairly wide social support (including among rural, i.e., 
Catholic people) and insist that the Slovene resistance was a communist 
manipulation and an instrument of the communist revolution from the very 
start. Historian Tamara Griesser-Pečar,  in a book entitled Razdvojeni narod 
(The split nation), published first in 2004 in German and then also in 
Slovene, attributed the blame for the intra-Slovene conflict during the war 
entirely to the communists. It is true that Griesser-Pečar mentioned that the 
“traditional political parties” did not succeed, either in 1941 or in 1943 
(following the capitulation of Italy), in combining their forces and taking 
the initiative in organizing the anti-occupation resistance. However, 
according to her interpretation, collaboration (to which the traditional 
                                                





parties and the dignitaries of the Ljubljana Diocese mainly agreed) is 
primarily to be blamed on the communists and the Liberation Front, since 
the “Village Guards” founded between 1941 and 1943 and supported by the 
Italians, were the result of a defensive response of the population to 
communist violence, while the goal of the Slovene Home Guards, founded 
with German help and under German command between 1943 and 1944, 
was supposed to be the struggle against the “Bolsheviks.” These were more 
or less the views held by members of the Slovene anti-communist 
emigration ever since the end of WW II and were not therefore new to the 
historiography of 2004. Griesser-Pečar's book thus did not attract major 
attention or louder controversy among historians and the public, since the 
opinion prevailed that, without any specific new arguments, she had 
repeated political evaluations that were as one-sided as the former 
communist ones.  
This was exemplarily revealed in the book by Bojana Godeša, a 
researcher at the Institute of Contemporary History in Ljubljana and one of 
the leading experts on conditions during WW II in Slovenia, which was 
published under the title Čas odločitev (Time of decisions) in 2012. As 
Godeša showed on the basis of extensive material, the leaders of the largest 
Slovene party, the Catholic People’s Party, were convinced after the 
capitulation of France of the long-term victory of the new German order in 
Europe, and thus advocated Yugoslavia joining the Tripartite Pact. Indeed, 
even before the German occupation of Slovenia and especially in the first 
months after it, they tried to achieve for Slovene territory a similar position 
to that of Tiso’s Slovakia and the Independent State of Croatia. In this way, 
collaboration of the traditional parties with the German and Italian 
occupiers occurred, as Godeša points out, immediately at the start of the 
occupation of Slovene and Yugoslav territory and not just when the 
communists in the Liberation Front called for general anti-occupier 
resistance. It is interesting that Bojan Godeša’s book also did not attract a 
great deal of public attention and the proposal that it should receive a 
national award for scientific achievements was rejected without reasoning, 
while the following year the author of a work on post-war “Red violence” 
without difficulty received the award. A very welcome addition to Slovene 
history writing is also the book by Gregor J. Kranjc’s To Walk with the 
Devil (2013). Its author, on the basis of a detailed study of sources and 
historical literature, on the one hand critically analyzes the resistance myths 
that are still present in Slovene works of history (e.g., the myth of the mass 
support for the partisans on the part of the population right from 1941 
onwards) and, on the other, convincingly rejects the standpoint still present 
in the works of the Slovene right and among emigrants, that organizing 
Slovene anti-partisan units with the aid of the occupiers was an act of self-
defence against the communist revolution, and not a collaboration with 
“deadly serious” and very tragic consequences.  
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There is greater unity, at least among historians, in evaluations of 
the mass killings of opponents of the partisan movement and communism in 
1945, since historians of all persuasions and orientations agree that this was 
an incomprehensible and unjustifiable crime, which should be investigated 
in detail. Some individuals try to ascribe responsibility for the killings 
exclusively to the Yugoslav communist authorities and even to Josip Broz 
Tito personally. Some try to explain the decision of the then communist 
leadership to deal ruthlessly with the fugitives and Home Guards units as a 
result of the tense international situation, aggravated by strained Yugoslav-
Western Allied relations. However, for most Slovene historians, there is no 
doubt that the then Slovene communist leadership was fully responsible for 
the mass post-war killings on Slovene territory. The editors of a collection 
of symposium papers published in 2005, organized by the National Council 
and entitled Victims of the War and of the Revolution (Golob et al.), 
therefore set out in its introduction that the extra-judicial killing of more 
than 14,000 former Home Guards and fugitives, who were returned from 
Austria to the Yugoslav authorities by the British in May and June 1945, 
was a constituent part of the “revolutionary, communist take-over and 
institutionalizing of power” in Slovenia; liquidations were organized and 
supervised by the Slovene communist secret police with the help of the 
army (Golob et al. 2005: 3–5). 
          At the centre of historical debate about conditions during WW II in 
Slovenia and Yugoslavia, as is evident from what has been said, are mainly 
various ideological-political interpretations, while methodological and 
conceptual questions of research and interpretation were pushed to the 
background. Modern methodological and conceptual approaches, more than 
in political studies are established in the study of economic, demographic 
and cultural history and some other themes that have become the subject of 
research precisely in the last two to three decades. These include the history 
of migrations, childhood, family life, gender relations, nutrition, and 
housing and material culture, as well as the Jews, anti-Semitism, and 
national exclusivism in Slovenia. Thus, while on the one hand, Slovene 
historians beginning in the second half of the 1980s visibly extended their 
research fields, on the other hand, Slovene history writing continues to be 
explicitly ethnocentric, since in comparison to the period of socialist 
Yugoslavia, there is now even less research that could comparatively extend 
into the wider South Slav or Central European space.  
 
IV 
Despite all the efforts of historians for critical and ideologically 
and politically unbiased historical interpretations of the “recent past” and 
the Yugoslav and Slovene communist period, they have failed to have any 




discussions on “what actually happened in Yugoslavia and Slovenia in the 
twentieth century.” In the mid-1990s, there were, however, some successful 
efforts to include post-communist historical interpretations in the school 
curricula. The modernized curricula strove for a politically impartial history 
of the past century, which, during the communist era, had been politicized 
to the extreme. They focused more on social and cultural-historical topics 
and, in a balanced way, included the presentation of the history of the South 
Slav nations. The textbooks were a bigger problem, since, in their desire for 
political and ideological impartiality, their authors resorted to historicism 
and piling up of often contradictory facts. This was contrary to the 
ambitions of the initiators of the modernized curricula, who believed that 
the goal of school history is to present to students the past reality not just 
from political or superficial social perspectives but also from the bottom-up 
perspective and the perspective of everyday life. In 2008, the history 
curricula were changed again, this time under the influence of the then 
ruling coalition headed by the Slovene Democratic Party (SDS). The scope 
of history of South Slav nations, as well as the history of the two 
Yugoslavias was extremely reduced, and the history of communism was 
only mentioned briefly within the framework of the subject “totalitarianism 
in the twentieth century,” which was supposed to include a (rather short) 
description of all three: fascism, Nazism, and communism. In the school 
curricula adopted in 2008, the prevailing aspect of twentieth-century history 
was thus more Slovene-centric and Western European-oriented than ever 
before (Vodopivec 2009). All in all, the interest of the school authorities 
and public in issues of history education in Slovenia has been surprisingly 
modest. There have been no detailed studies or data on what teachers 
actually teach at schools, nor have there been any views and positions 
expressed on the contents and manner of their presentations. 
Public polemic concerning WW II and Slovene and Yugoslav 
communism, which has divided Slovene political parties since the early 
1990s and has uncompromisingly continued into the twenty-first century, 
has in general had little influence on public opinion. According to a public 
opinion poll carried out during Slovenia’s process of accession to the 
European Union (2003) by the Faculty of Social Sciences in Ljubljana, 
more than 45% of those polled believed that the partisan movement was 
massively supported by the population during WW II, as many as 35% 
agreed with the statement that collaboration with the occupiers was an act 
of national treason and only 15% agreed that Home Guard collaborationist 
units justifiably opposed the communist resistance, although, in their 
opinion, they should not have collaborated with the occupying forces. More 
than 43% of respondents agreed that Slovenia’s accession to the Kingdom 
of SCS in 1918 was actually a decision of the Great Powers and 38.5% 
believed that it would already have been better to establish an independent 
Slovene state then; at the same time, more than 43% had good memories of 
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socialist Yugoslavia, more than 53% agreed on the “predominantly positive 
contacts” with the populations of other Yugoslav nations and republics and 
more than 73% agreed that they had lived (relatively) well in Yugoslavia 
before it broke apart (Toš 2004).  
This did not, however, convince those who called for a radical 
“revision” of history, insisting on the exclusive guilt of the communists for 
Slovene internal conflict during WW II and demanding decisive public 
condemnation of the post-war Slovene and Yugoslav political regime as a 
whole. In 1996, the general public prosecutor, an active member of Nova 
slovenska zaveza (New Slovene Covenant), which brings together surviving 
members of collaborationist units during WW II and their relatives, called 
for a review of the trial against Ljubljana Bishop Gregorij Rožman, who 
was sentenced in absentia in 1946 to long imprisonment for his negative 
attitude to the partisan movement and support for collaboration. After 
lengthy and often interrupted proceedings, the court in Ljubljana ruled in 
2009 that severe procedural violations had occurred during the trial in 1946 
and that a retrial should take place. Since Bishop Rožman died in 1959, this 
was entirely meaningless, but the Slovene church authorities and Nova 
slovenska zaveza interpreted this verdict as Rožman’s rehabilitation. On the 
other hand, a part of the public and media took it as an intolerable changing 
of history and the victory of politically motivated revisionism.  
According to the results of the most up-to-date public opinion 
polls, the attitude of the respondents to recent history has not changed 
markedly over the last decade. On the contrary, in Slovenia’s current 
conditions of social and economic crisis, the percentage of respondents who 
believe that communist Yugoslavia, despite its numerous deficiencies, was 
in fact a fairly nice country, has even increased. Some research has also 
revealed the phenomenon of uncritical idealization on the part of the young 
about life in the former federation; although they could not remember 
Yugoslavia and communism from their own experience, they attribute to the 
“recent past” some qualities that they miss in the insecure conditions of the 
present day. At the same time, a large part of the public is fed up with the 
interminable disputes about the past. There has thus been a visible decline 
in interest in recent years among literary writers. After a number of 
prominent novels dealing with WW II and the post-war violence of the 
communist authorities, which were published in the 1970s and 1980s, the 
number of literary works dealing with this subject has declined; moreover, 
young authors seem to be completely uninterested in themes related to the 
communist and Yugoslav period. According to various surveys, the 
prevailing public opinion is that the victims of post-war killings should be 
given a decent funeral as soon as possible, people should come to terms 
with the fact that various interpretations of the past exist in people’s 
memories, and any more complex assessment of recent history should be 




Like elsewhere in Europe and in the world, and in particular in the 
former communist countries, the history of the twentieth century in 
Slovenia continues to irreconcilably divide politicians, the public, and 
researchers. All theses on the collective or even predominant Slovene 
memory and historical discourse, at least as regards the twentieth century, 
are fairly unconvincing (Bajt 2009). Despite some recent tendencies in 
historiography calling for de-nationalization of interpretations of Medieval 
and early modern history, and disagreements on how “Slovene” the 
“Slovenes” were at that time, there has at least been a relative degree of 
consensus on the most important processes in more distant periods. On the 
other hand, discourses on events in Slovenia during WW II and on the 
nature of the Slovene and Yugoslav communist regime after the war are still 
far from a national consensus. The formation of a critical but nationally and 
ideologically balanced post-communist and post-Yugoslav interpretation of 
all other events in recent history is a multi-layered, pluralistic and 
conflicting process, which has so far not showed any signs of reconciliation 
of the opposing and often strongly contradictory perspectives in public 
memory or in historiographical interpretations. This is the case both in 
Slovenia and in other countries of the former Yugoslavia. To some extent, 
reconciliation could perhaps be accelerated by a more ambitiously devised 
comparative study that would put the national-historical experience in a 
wider Yugoslav, central European and European context, for which, 
however, Slovene historians have not yet shown any great interest.  
 Institute of Contemporary History 







Bajt, Veronika. 2009. Postkomunističko obnavljanje kolektivnog pamćenja 
i nacionalnog identiteta (Post-communist reconstruction of the 
collective memory and national identity). In Pamćenje i nostalgija 
(Memory and nostalgia), ed. Gordana Đerić, 83–114. Beograd: 
Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, IP “Filip Višnjić”. 
Bukowski, Charles. 2006. Slovene foreign policy toward Serbia. 
Reclaiming the past. Slovene Studies: Journal of the Society for 
Slovene Studies 28: 15–19. 
Deželak-Barič, Vida. 2014. Smrtne žrtve druge svetovne vojne in zaradi nje 
na Slovenskem (Victims of World War II in Slovenia). In Nasilje 
vojnih in povojnih dni (The violence of the war and post-war 
years), 11–46. Series Vpogledi 8. Ljubljana: Inštitut za novejšo 
zgodovino. 
CONFLICTING POLITICS OF HISTORY AND MEMORY 
 
63 
Fischer, Jasna, Neven Borak, and Zdenko Čepič, eds. 2005. Slovenska 
novejša zgodovina, Od programa Zedinjene Slovenije do 
mednarodnega priznanja Republike Slovenije, 1848-1992 (Slovene 
modern history, from the Program of United Slovenia to 
international recognition of the Republic of Slovenia). Part I.  
Ljubljana: Mladinska knjiga – Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino 
(Institute of Contemporary History). 
Godeša, Bojan. 2011. Čas odločitev: Katoliški tabor in začetek okupacije 
(Time of decisions: The Catholic camp and the beginning of the 
occupation). Series Premiki. Ljubljana: Mladinska knjiga.  
Golob, Janvit, Peter Vodopivec, Tine Hribar, Janko Prunk, and Milena 
Basta, eds. 2005. Žrtve vojne in revolucije (Victims of the war and 
revolution). Ljubljana: Državni svet republike Slovenije. 
Griesser-Pečar, Tamara. 2004. Razdvojeni narod: Slovenija 1941-1945: 
okupacija, kolaboracija, državljanska vojna, revolucija. Translated 
by Tamara Giesser-Pečar, Marko Urbanija, and Nataša Petrnel. 
Ljubljana: Mladinska knjiga. 
Kranjc, Gregor Joseph. 2013. To walk with the devil, Slovene collaboration 
and Axis occupation, 1941-1945, University of Toronto Press. 
Luthar, Oto, ed. 2008. The land between. Frankfurt: Peter Lang. 
Perovšek, Jure. 1996. Liberalizem in vprašanje slovenstva (Liberalism and 
the question of Slovene identity). Ljubljana: Modrijan. 
Pirjevec, Jože. 1995. Jugoslavija 1918-1991. Koper: Lipa. 
———. 2003. Jugoslovanske vojne 1991-2001 (The Yugoslav wars), 
Ljubljana: Cankarjeva založba. 
———. 2011. Tito in tovariši (Tito and comrades). Ljubljana: Mladinska 
knjiga. 
Štih, Peter. 2009. Vasko Simoniti: Na stičišču svetov, Slovenska zgodovina 
od prazgodovinskih kultur do konca 18. Stoletja (At the crossroads 
of the world, Slovene history from prehistoric culture to the end of 
the eighteenth century). Ljubljana: Modrijan. 
Toš, Niko. 1997. Vrednote v prehodu I, Slovensko javno mnenje, 1968-1990 
(Values in transition, Slovene public opinion). Ljubljana: Center za 
raziskovanje javnega mnenja, Fakulteta za družbene vede – 
Faculty of Social Sciences. 
Vodopivec, Nina. 2002. Etnografija spomenikov medvojnih in povojnih 
pobojev (The Ethnography of the monuments to killings during 
and after WWII). Article manuscript. Znanstveno raziskovalni 
center SAZU, (Scientific Research Centre of the Slovene 
Academy), Ljubljana. 
Vodopivec, Peter. 2003. Historiography in Slovenia today. Slovene Studies, 
Journal of the Society for the Slovene Studies 25: 5–21.  
———. 2006a. Slovenia in 1945. Slovene Studies 28: 53–66. 
———. 2006b. Od Pohlinove slovnice do samostojne države, Slovenska 




grammar to the independent  state, Slovene history from the end of 
the eighteenth until the end of the twentieth century). Ljubljana: 
Modrijan.  
———. 2009. Politics of history education in Slovenia and Slovene history 
textbooks since 1990. In Transition of History Education in 
Southeast Europe, ed. Augusta Dimou, 45–69. Studien des Georg 
Eckert Instituts zur internationalen Bildungsmedienforschung 124. 
Götingen: V&R unipress.  
———. 2010. On Slovene troubles with the recent past and historical 
memory. In Conflict and memory: Bridging past and future in 
(South East) Europe, ed. Wolfgang Petritsch and Vedran Džihiž, 
247–63. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlaggesellschaft. 
Vodopivec, Peter, Vasko Simoniti, and Peter Štih. 2008. Slowenische 




KONFLIKTNA POLITIKA ZGODOVINE IN SPOMINA V 
SLOVENIJI PO LETU 1990 
Avtor članka uvodoma ugotavlja, da slovenski voditelji – razen redkih, 
slabo vplivnih izjem – niso niti v 19. niti v 20. stoletju resneje razmišljali o 
slovenski državni samostojnosti, zaradi česar je bila slovenska 
osamosvojitev leta 1991 za Slovenijo radikalen zgodovinski prelom. Pri tem 
je v slovenski politiki in javnosti po osamosvojitvi prevladalo stališče, da je 
prelom dokončen in mora Slovenija pretrgati vse vezi s preostankom 
Jugoslavije. Del novih političnih voditeljev je glasno izjavljal, da pri 
vprašanju »Evropa ali Balkan« ni dileme, saj je slovenski cilj lahko le 
Evropa, prednostna naloga slovenske politike pa vključitev Slovenije v EU, 
NATO in druge mednarodne in finančne organizacije. Slovenija je po 
razpadu Jugoslavije ohranila živahnejše stike le s Hrvaško, vendar jih je 
zapletalo nerešeno vprašanje poteka državne meje, v Ljubljani so kazali več 
zanimanja še za sodelovanje z Bosno in Hercegovino, ki je postala po 
končani vojni zanimivo tržišče za slovensko gospodarstvo, za aktivnejšo 
ureditev odnosov s srbsko-črnogorskim preostankom Jugoslavije pa so se 
odločili šele konec devetdesetih let, ko za slovensko članstvo v EU in NATU 
ni bilo več večjih ovir, ameriško bombardiranje Srbije pa je oslabilo 
Miloševićev režim. 
Čeprav je bilo v razpravah o razpadli Jugoslaviji slišati različna 
mnenja, je v slovenski javnosti prevladovalo stališče, da so Jugoslavijo vse 
od nastanka pretresala nerešljiva nasprotja in spopadi med centralističnimi 
in federalističnimi silami, kar je onemogočalo nacionalno enakopravnost in 
tudi Slovenijo oviralo v njenem razvoju. Razpad Jugoslavije naj bi bil tako 
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neizogiben in posledica nerešljivih nacionalnih razlik, glavni krivec za 
nasilni razkroj jugoslovanske države pa naj bi bil srbski nacionalizem. 
Vseeno so javno mnenje bolj kot razprave o razpadli Jugoslaviji in 
slovenskem položaju v njej delila  (in še vedno delijo) vprašanja o 
jugoslovanskem komunizmu ter o razmerah v Sloveniji med drugo svetovno 
vojno in neposredno po njej. Najbolj vneti zagovorniki revizije 
»komunistične zgodovine« slovenskemu odporniškemu gibanju v letih 1941-
1945 še naprej odrekajo vsak pomen, ga v celoti označujejo za 
komunistično in trdijo, da pripadniki slovenskih protipartizanskih enot, niso 
bili kolaboranti, temveč protikomunistični borci. Javne polemike je še 
zaostrilo odkrivanje množičnih, v času komunističnega režima prikritih 
grobišč po vojni skrivoma pomorjenih pripadnikov kolaborantskih enot in 
komunističnih nasprotnikov. V do leta 2004 vladajočih levih političnih 
strankah so politične razsežnosti povojnih pobojev podcenjevali in niso 
storili  ničesar, da bi jih raziskali in pomorjene dostojno pokopali. V 
takšnem ozračju v Sloveniji po osamosvojitvi tudi ni prišlo do 
množičnejšega preimenovanja ulic in trgov ali odstranjevanja v času 
Jugoslavije postavljenih spominskih obeležij, saj je bila odločitev o tem 
večinoma prepuščena lokalnim oblastem, polemike o komunističnem nasilju 
med vojno in po njej pa so se le stopnjevale. 
Odprta vprašanje naj bo bolj oddaljene ali bližnje slovenske 
preteklosti so povzročala (in še povzročajo) precej manj polemičnih 
razhajanj v zgodovinopisju. Avtor članka predstavlja glavne značilnosti 
razvoja slovenskega zgodovinopisja od srede osemdesetih let preteklega 
stoletja dalje ter prevladujoče zgodovinopisne ocene in razlage razmer v 
prvi in drugi Jugoslaviji, pri čemer ugotavlja, da povzročajo tudi v 
zgodovinopisju največ razhajanj različna gledanja na razmere v Sloveniji in 
Jugoslaviji med drugo svetovno vojno. V tej zvezi na eni strani opozarja na 
zgodovinopisna dela, ki so od začetka devetdesetih let kritično razširila 
sliko druge svetovne vojne v Sloveniji in Jugoslaviji, na drugi pa na dela in 
avtorje, ki so zlasti v zadnjem času s temeljito analizo razpoložljivega 
gradiva osvetlili tedanje dogajanje in politične odločitve z novih vidikov ali 
celo v povsem novi luči (med njimi posebej omenja knjigo Bojana Godeše 
Čas odločitev, ki  potrjuje, da je prišlo do kolaboracije tradicionalnih 
slovenskih strank z nemškimi in italijanskimi okupatorji že takoj ob začetku 
okupacije in ne šele potem, ko so komunisti z OF pozvali k vsesplošnemu 
odporu, ter knjigo Gregorja J. Kranjca To Walk with the Devil, ki kritično 
analizira v zgodovinopisju še vedno prisotne odporniške mite, obenem pa 
zavrača stališče, da je bilo organiziranje proti-partizanskih enot s pomočjo 
okupatorjev dejanje samoobrambe pred komunistično revolucijo in ne 
kolaboracija). Avtor sklene članek z opozorilom, da zgodovinopisje nima 
večjega vpliva na zelo čustvene in spolitizirane slovenske razprave  o drugi 
svetovni vojni in po njej, medtem ko v javnem mnenju – kot kažejo raziskave 




letih 1941-1945 podporo večine slovenskega prebivalstva in je bila 
odločitev za odpor leta 1941 edina prava odločitev. 
